Moral Status, Luck, and Modal Capacities: Debating Shelly Kagan by Lloyd, Harry R.
Page 1 of 15 
Moral status, luck, and modal capacities: debating Shelly 
Kagan
Harry R. Lloyd 
Department of Philosophy,  
Yale University,  
P.O. Box 208306,  




ABSTRACT: Shelly Kagan has recently defended the view that it is morally worse for a human 
being to suffer some harm than it is for a lower animal (such as a dog or a cow) to suffer a harm 
that is equally severe (ceteris paribus). In this paper, I argue that this view receives rather less 
support from our intuitions than one might at first suppose. According to Kagan, moreover, an 
individual’s moral status depends partly upon her ‘modal capacities.’ In this paper, I argue that 
the most natural strategy for justifying Kagan’s theory faces some important challenges. More 
generally, I argue that philosophers who wish to defend the view that human beings have a 
higher moral status than that of the lower animals face a dilemma. Either their theory of moral 
status will imply (unacceptably) that some severely cognitively impaired human beings have a 
significantly lower moral status than that of typical human beings, or these philosophers will 
be forced to ground moral status in a set of properties so far removed from a subject’s actual 




In How to Count Animals, more or less,1 and in an earlier lecture printed in this journal,2 Shelly 
Kagan argues that the lower animals (such as cows and dogs) have a lesser ‘moral status’ than 
most human beings – call this view hierarchy. In particular, one of the views that Kagan 
defends is the view that, ceteris paribus, and even putting aside concerns about distributive 
justice, it is morally worse for a typical human being to suffer some harm than it is for a lower 
animal to suffer a harm that is equally severe – and mutatis mutandis for benefits (HCA, §4.3) 
– call this view simple axiological hierarchy.3 Kagan thinks that our intuitions concerning a 
certain type of thought experiment support this view; I challenge that claim in §II of this paper. 
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aware of Surovell’s article after the current paper went to press. 
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 Axiological hierarchy concerns the goodness of outcomes. One way in which one could 
incorporate hierarchy into one’s theory of right action would be to combine axiological 
hierarchy with consequentialism. Alternatively, a deontologist could incorporate hierarchy into 
her theory of right action (regardless of whether or not she endorses axiological hierarchy) by 
maintaining that whilst (at least most) human beings have certain strong natural rights against 
being harmed or killed, the natural rights of lower animals are, at the very least, more easily 
permissibly infringed – call this view rights-focused hierarchy.4 A rights-focused hierarchy 
theorist might, for example, hold the view that for any given positive value h, it is morally 
impermissible to inflict h utils worth of pain upon a victim, unless doing so will generate at 
least mh utils worth of pleasure, where the value of the multiplier m is proportional to the moral 
status of the victim of the harm (HCA, §9.2). 
 One possible alternative to (both types of) hierarchy is the view that lower animals lack 
any kind of moral status whatsoever – call this view chauvinism. Immanuel Kant is a famous 
example of a chauvinist, since he argues that one ought to avoid cruelty towards lower animals 
only because this has a beneficial effect upon one’s own character, making it less likely that 
one will be cruel to human beings in the future.5 Kantian chauvinism is highly implausible: 
even if one could find a way to gratuitously torture lower animals without this having any 
deleterious effect upon one’s moral character, it would nonetheless be egregiously morally 
wrong. 
 Another possible alternative to hierarchy is the view that all or almost all animals 
(perhaps with some exceptions, like sponges) have the same moral status – call this view 
unitarianism.6 Chauvinists and hierarchy theorists are both anti-unitarians. I believe that 
unitarianism is correct, and one of my key aims in this paper is to draw attention to a dilemma 
that confronts anti-unitarian theorists like Kagan. 
 Here’s the dilemma faced by anti-unitarian theorists: either (first horn) their theory will 
imply (unacceptably) that severely impaired human beings with similar cognitive capacities to 
the lower animals have a significantly lower moral status than that of typical human beings, or 
(second horn) these theorists will be forced to ground moral status in a set of properties so far 
removed from a subject’s actual capacities that it will become difficult to see why these kinds 
of properties should have such moral importance. I illustrate the anti-unitarian’s dilemma in 
§III of this paper: theories of moral status that appeal exclusively to features like cognitive 
and/or emotional capacities are impaled upon the first horn, whereas theories of moral status 
that appeal to species membership are impaled upon the second.  
 In §§IV-VI, I discuss Kagan’s theory of moral status. I begin, in §IV, by summarising 
some of the theory’s attractive features. I argue in §§V-VI, however, that the most natural 
strategy for extricating this theory from the second horn of the anti-unitarian’s dilemma faces 
some important challenges. In §VII, I argue that unitarianism avoids both horns of the anti-
unitarian’s dilemma. In §VIII, I conclude. 
II. Our intuitions about hierarchy 
Before I discuss the anti-unitarian’s dilemma, I want to briefly discuss one of the thought 
experiments that (partially) motivates Kagan’s hierarchical theory. In attempting to establish 
that simple axiological hierarchy is intuitively plausible, Kagan – echoing an earlier argument 
made by Jean Kazez7 – suggests that we should consider a case in which a human being and a 
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mouse are suffering from equally painful toothaches (HCA, p. 99). Kagan reports the intuition 
that it would be more important, morally speaking, to avert the human toothache than it would 
be to avert the mouse toothache.8 
Speaking here as a card-carrying consequentialist, I agree with Kagan that averting the 
human toothache is almost certainly more important than averting the mouse toothache. But I 
disagree that this stands as evidence in favour of axiological hierarchy. In virtue of our 
advanced cognitive capacities, we human beings can, and often do, engage in certain highly 
valuable projects that aren’t open to mice. We build friendships, acquire systematic knowledge, 
and express ourselves, all in ways that go far beyond what any mouse could ever imagine.9 
But: we cannot do any of these things particularly well when we have a toothache!10 Thus, I 
claim that we form our intuitive reaction to the Kagan-Kazez thought experiment based on the 
justified assumption that there is more welfare at stake for the human being than there is for 
the mouse. 
 To try to get some proper intuitions about axiological hierarchy, we might instead 
consider a case in which a human being and a dog suffer equally painful cases of stubbing their 
toe. Crucially, we should suppose that the human being was walking along doing nothing in 
particular, that the pains quickly subside, that they were not anticipated, and that they are 
immediately forgotten.11 In evaluating this case, I for one am inclined to intuit that the human 
pain is no more important, morally speaking, than the dog’s pain.12 If the dog’s pain were to 
be slightly higher, then I would prioritise averting it over averting the human being’s pain. 
 My aim in presenting this toe-stubbing case is to suggest that thought experiments 
which involve comparing a harm to a human against a harm to an animal provide considerably 
less support to axiological hierarchy than one might at first suppose. It would be wrong to 
claim, however, that my intuitive reaction to the toe-stubbing case is inconsistent with every 
potential form of simple axiological hierarchy.13 According to one version of simple 
axiological hierarchy, for example, an individual’s moral status affects the moral disvalue of 
harming her only for harms that exceed a certain level of severity, which cannot be met by 
short-lived harms – like toe-stubbings – that are immediately forgotten. Likewise, consider the 
(rather less ad hoc) hierarchical view that the moral disvalue D of a harm that inflicts h utils 
worth of pain is given by D = (1+ε)mh, where ε is small and positive, and m is proportional to 
the moral status of the victim. D will be insensitive to m when h is small, but much more 
sensitive to m when h is large. Thus, the moral disvalues of the dog’s toe stubbing and of the 
human’s toe stubbing (in the context of my thought experiment) will, according to this theory, 
be close to identical even if the cross-species difference in m is large, since the common h is 
relatively small. 
 Some people might disagree with my intuitive response to the toe-stubbing thought 
experiment, instead intuiting that the dog’s pain matters less than the human’s pain. Perhaps, 
however, we can attempt a debunking response to that kind of intuition. Philosophers and 
cognitive scientists since Hume and Adam Smith have recognised the important role that 
empathy plays in the formation of our moral judgements.14 Perhaps axiologically hierarchical 
intuitions are the product of deficiencies in our empathetic faculty. I, for one, find it harder to 
imagine what it is like to be a dog than to imagine what it is like to be another human being. 
Hence, I often find it easier to empathise with human beings than to empathise with dogs. This 
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looks more like evidence of a deficient empathetic faculty, prone to in-group and similarity 
biases, than it looks like evidence of dog pain mattering less than human pain.15 
Our lack of empathy towards the lower animals might be partly caused by the fact that 
our society’s pervasive use of animals for food, clothing, and medical testing encourages an 
instrumental attitude towards animals: a recent study of Italian veterinary students found 
evidence of a link between instrumental perceptions of the lower animals and reduced empathy 
for them (although the direction of causation is still somewhat unclear).16 Our lack of empathy 
for the lower animals might also be partly caused by the fact that most of us tend to witness 
animal suffering much less frequently than we witness human suffering. As Mengzi remarks 
(Mencius 1A7), “as for the relation of gentlemen to birds and beasts … if they hear their cries, 
they cannot bear to eat their flesh. Hence, gentlemen keep their distance from the kitchen 
[where animals are slaughtered to be eaten].”17 
Still, many people’s intuitions probably support rights-focused hierarchy more robustly 
than they support simple axiological hierarchy. Many people probably intuit both (a) that it is 
morally impermissible to harvest one healthy human being’s organs without their permission 
in order to save five others, and also (b) that it is at worst morally permissible, and perhaps 
even morally obligatory, to harvest one healthy rabbit’s organs in order to save five other 
rabbits (HCA, p. 192).18 Of course, one might attempt a debunking response to these kinds of 
intuitions too. However, I want to argue in the remainder of this paper that rights-focused 
hierarchy is difficult to sustain even if we concede that it is prima facie intuitively plausible. 
III. The naïve actual-capacities theory, and speciesism 
On what grounds might one try to sustain hierarchy about moral status? According to one 
initially attractive proposal, an individual’s moral status depends upon her cognitive and/or 
emotional capacities, with lower animals having a moral status considerably lower than that of 
a typical human being – call this the (naïve) actual-capacities theory. It has struck several 
critics of the simple-axiological version of the naïve actual-capacities theory as implausible to 
suppose, however, that an individual’s cognitive and/or emotional capacities are the sort of 
things that could bear upon the moral (dis)value of harming or benefitting her (HCA, §4.4). 
These critics ask: why should the fact that human beings typically possess advanced cognitive 
capacities constitute a reason for thinking that it is worse to harm a typical human being than 
to inflict an equally severe harm upon a lower animal? I think that many people, even some 
who are initially attracted to simple axiological hierarchy, will feel greater intuitive unease 
about assigning axiological importance to an individual’s cognitive and/or emotional capacities 
than they would feel about assigning axiological importance to, say, the durations of harms, or 
to whether an individual is worse off than others through no fault of her own. 
 On this score the prospects for the rights-focused version of actual-capacities hierarchy 
appear to be somewhat brighter. Philosophers who believe in the existence of natural rights 
often ground these rights in the fact that typical human beings are ‘autonomous persons’, 
cognitively capable of practical reasoning about personalised life-plans and projects (HCA, 
§8.2, EK, pp. 252-8, 473-85). The rough idea here is that the purpose of natural rights is to, in 
some sense, ‘protect’ the autonomy of such persons. The rights-focused actual-capacities 
hierarchy theorist can now point out, however, that the lower animals are much less capable 
than typical human beings are at engaging in this kind of practical reasoning, precisely because 
they have less-sophisticated cognitive capacities. According to this view, the robustness of 
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one’s natural rights ought to depend upon one’s degree of autonomy,19 and one’s degree of 
autonomy in fact depends upon (a certain subset of) one’s cognitive capacities. 
 Both versions of the naïve actual-capacities theory are, however, impaled upon the first 
horn of the anti-unitarian’s dilemma. The naïve actual-capacities theory implies that some 
severely cognitively impaired human beings (whose cognitive and emotional capacities are 
similar to those of the lower animals) have a comparable moral status to that of the lower 
animals, rather than to that of typical human beings. I think that many people would intuit, to 
the contrary, that severely cognitively impaired human beings have the same rights as those 
held by typical human beings, at least insofar as it is no more permissible to harvest the organs 
of one severely cognitively impaired human in order to save n other severely impaired humans 
than it is permissible to kill one typical human in order to save n other typical humans. And 
even those people who do not share this intuition will probably wish to claim that severely 
impaired human beings have rights that are more closely comparable to the rights of typical 
human beings than they are to the rights of lower animals.20 Any version of the naïve actual-
capacities theory that puts a significant moral distance between typical human beings and the 
lower animals is impaled upon the first horn of the anti-unitarian’s dilemma (see §I above).21 
 One way to avoid the first horn of the anti-unitarian’s dilemma is to adopt the view that 
an individual’s moral status depends upon the typical capacities of a member of her species – 
call this view speciesism. This approach too, however, faces some problems. First of all, it is 
difficult to see why the typical capacities of a member of one’s species should have any 
significant moral importance. Why is this as important as – or more important than – an 
individual’s own capacities? In any case, why is species (on any candidate definition, of which 
there are many22) the right taxon for us to refer to here?23 Speciesism is impaled upon the 
second horn of the anti-unitarian’s dilemma. 
Speciesism is also vulnerable to counterexamples. For sake of argument, suppose that 
we adopt Ernst Mayr’s well-known ‘biological’ conception of a species as: a group of 
reproductively isolated individuals, capable of interbreeding to produce fertile offspring.24 
Under that assumption, here’s a counterexample to speciesism: suppose that I carry out a 
worldwide gene-editing campaign, splitting humanity into two species. A-humans can breed to 
produce fertile offspring with other A-humans; likewise for B-humans; and this is the full 
extent of my genetic meddling. Now, suppose that because of an astronomically unlikely case 
of coincident de novo genetic mutations, all of the next generation of A-humans are born with 
a severe and heritable cognitive deficiency. Suppose that a small proportion of the next 
generation of B-humans are also born with the deficiency. Speciesism implies that the impaired 
A-humans have a lower moral status than the impaired B-humans. This implication is 
implausible, and should be rejected.25 (Note that this particular counterexample cannot be 
sidestepped by a theory in which (a) membership of a sophisticated species and (b) personal 
possession of sophisticated capacities each count as sufficient but unnecessary conditions for 
possessing full moral status.) 
IV. Kagan’s hierarchical theory 
Kagan’s hierarchical theory of moral status can be construed as an attempt to avoid the common 
counterexamples to both speciesism and the actual-capacities theory. According to Kagan’s 
theory, an individual’s moral status depends not only upon her actual capacities, but also upon 
(a) her modal capacities – the capacities that she could have had (HCA, §5.5) – and (b) her 
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potential capacities – the capacities that she stands to have in the future (HCA, §5.4). A modal 
person is someone who could have had the capacities necessary for things like rationality, self-
consciousness, and practical reasoning – the capacities that are constitutive of personhood. To 
make Kagan’s theory work, we will have to adopt a conception of modal capacities, modal 
personhood, and ‘could have had’ that comes in degrees (HCA, p. 140) – and likewise for 
potential capacities and ‘stands to have’ (HCA, pp. 136-7). The strength of an individual’s 
modal personhood, for example, will depend upon the degree of similarity (for some suitable 
definition of ‘similarity’, which I’ll leave implicit in this paper) between (a) the actual world 
and (b) the nearest possible world(s) in which that individual is a person.  
 Kagan argues that his theory of hierarchy can be used to defend the view that severely 
cognitively impaired human beings have a moral status that is closer to that of a typical human 
being than it is to that of a lower animal (HCA, §6.3). (i) Somebody who suffers brain damage 
in the womb or in a car accident is a strong modal person, because she could have (to this day) 
been a person, if only she had not suffered her accident. (ii) Likewise, someone who is 
cognitively impaired because of a genetic condition is a strong modal person, because she could 
have developed into a person, if only her genome had been slightly different. Kagan’s theory 
thus appears to improve upon speciesism, because it does not imply that A-humans (see §III 
above) have the same moral status as the lower animals. Were it not for their ‘unlikely’ genetic 
mutations, the A-humans could have been persons. Hence, the A-humans have a moral status 
that is similar to that of typical human beings, and equal to that of any impaired B-humans. 
 Argument (ii) here is controversial, because it requires us to reject the view that no 
individual could have been born with a different genome to the one that she was actually born 
with. In other words, it requires us to reject the view that having been born with the genome 
that one was actually born with is an essential property of any individual – call this view genetic 
essentialism. Kagan tells us that he is minded to reject genetic essentialism, although he does 
not explain why (HCA, p. 161). As it happens, several moral philosophers have recently 
advanced arguments against genetic essentialism.26 I obviously cannot hope to evaluate the 
merits of those arguments in this paper. Fortunately, neither do I need to: my intention in this 
paper is to show that even if genetic essentialism is false, and so Kagan’s theory avoids the first 
horn of the anti-unitarian’s dilemma, Kagan’s theory is nonetheless impaled upon the second 
horn of the dilemma (see §§V-VI below). 
 In contrast to the two examples involving cognitively impaired human beings that we 
have just been discussing, consider the example of my dog, Fido. In certain possible worlds, a 
genetic therapy conferring advanced cognitive capacities upon dogs has already achieved 
widespread adoption. Many of us will be inclined to say that in these worlds, Fido would, in 
all likelihood, have become a person.27 Nonetheless, because these worlds are very different 
from the actual world, Fido is only a very weak modal person (HCA, p. 140). Likewise, only 
very extensive changes to Fido’s genome at conception could have produced an individual that 
would have gone on to develop the advanced cognitive capacities of a human person. Thus, it 
would be implausible to claim that Fido could have been born with the intrinsic potential to 
become a person, and so Kagan’s theory of hierarchy implies that Fido has a lower moral status 
than that of human beings. 
My discussion of Kagan’s theory has thus-far focused upon his appeal to modal 
capacities. Kagan’s appeal to potential capacities, however, is also important. Without this 
 
Page 7 of 15 
appeal, Kagan’s theory would implausibly imply that new-born human infants have a moral 
status comparable to that of the lower animals, rather than to that of typical adult human beings. 
I think that many people would intuit, to contrary, that new-born human infants have rights 
identical to those held by typical human beings, at least insofar as it is no more permissible to 
harvest the organs of one new-born human infant in order to save n other new-born human 
infants than it is to kill one typical human adult in order to save n other typical human adults. 
And even those people who do not share this intuition will probably wish to claim that new-
born human infants have rights that are more closely comparable to the rights of typical human 
adults than they are to the rights of lower animals. 
 The plausibility of Kagan’s theory of hierarchy depends, then, upon all three of his 
appeals to (a) actual capacities, (b) potential capacities, and (c) modal capacities. If Kagan 
cannot justify (b), then he cannot justify why new-born infants have a moral status similar to 
that of typical human adults. If he cannot justify (c), then he cannot justify why severely 
cognitively impaired human beings have (regardless of whether their impairment is congenital, 
or caused by an accident) a moral status similar to that of typical human beings. Compared to 
theories of hierarchy that have previously been proposed by other philosophers, however, 
Kagan’s appeal to modal capacities is much more novel than his appeal to potential capacities. 
For this reason, my critique of Kagan’s theory in §§V-VI of this paper will focus on the former, 
rather than the later.28  
V. Justifying the appeal to modal capacities? 
Suppose that one accepts the view that an individual’s cognitive and/or emotional capacities 
are the sorts of things that might bear upon her moral status.29 Why, we might then ask, should 
an individual’s modal capacities, as well as her actual capacities, also affect her moral status? 
Without some kind of answer to this question, I think that many people, even amongst those 
who are initially attracted to hierarchy, will feel greater unease about assigning moral 
importance to an individual’s modal capacities than they would feel about assigning moral 
importance to, say, the durations of harms, or to whether an individual is worse off than others 
through no fault of her own.30 
 The most promising strategy that I am aware of to respond to this question on Kagan’s 
behalf draws upon considerations concerning luck. If moral status were to not in part depend 
upon modal capacities, then bad luck – suffering cognitive impairment as a result of an accident 
or a genetic defect, for example – would be capable of robbing a person of anything close to 
the moral status that she would otherwise have enjoyed, if only she had not been so unlucky. 
It seems plausible to suppose, moreover, that bad luck should not be capable of reducing a 
person’s moral status this drastically.31 This defence of Kagan’s appeal to modal capacities 
relies on us accepting a certain modal analysis of ‘bad luck’. Losing out on something, through 
no fault of one’s own, counts as bad luck to the extent that one could have had it, in the degree-
theoretic sense of ‘could have had’ that I introduced in §IV.32 
Unfortunately (for Kagan), although this modal reading of ‘bad luck’ might well be 
faithful to a certain construal of that concept, I do not believe that it can do philosophical work 
in justifying Kagan’s appeal to modal capacities. To see why this is so, consider the case of a 
child, whose parents lost their family fortune by making some bad investments on the stock 
market just before their child was born.33 According to the modal conception of bad luck, this 
child is unluckier than a child whose family has been poor for generations. The possible worlds 
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in which the first child’s parents chose to invest in more profitable companies are much more 
similar to the actual world than are any possible worlds in which the second child’s parents are 
rich (on any tenable conception of the similarity relation between possible worlds). Even if in 
some sense the first child is ‘unluckier’ than the second, this is not a sense of the word ‘luck’ 
that should be invested with any moral significance. A luck egalitarian would want to treat 
both children equally, for example. 
What makes both of these children unlucky in the morally relevant sense is that they 
are both unfortunate in their formative circumstances, and are both (obviously) not themselves 
responsible for this disadvantage.34 Now, someone who wants to accept this claim and yet to 
resist the apparently absurd view that individuals who are born as cows are just as unlucky, in 
the morally relevant sense, as individuals who are born as severely impaired human beings35 
might wish to argue that what counts as a ‘misfortune’ for an impaired human being doesn’t 
count as a misfortune for a cow, where ‘fortune’ is to be understood as a technical term that 
refers to how well an individual’s life goes, or how she flourishes (EK, p. 145).36 Nonetheless, 
anyone who tries to use this manoeuvre to preserve Kagan’s appeal to modal capacities will 
merely be kicking the can down the road. If the strength of an individual’s misfortune in failing 
to have certain capacities is to be equal to the modal strength of her possession of those 
capacities, then misfortune will have to be defined modally, in terms of the capacities that the 
individual could have had. Yet this will leave our account of misfortune vulnerable to 
counterexamples along the same lines as ‘two children’ counterexample (involving the recently 
impoverished parents) that I raised as an objection to the modal conception of bad luck. 
My critique in this section has been strongly coloured by the assumption that the modal 
capacities hierarchy theorist must adopt a conception of ‘could have been’ that comes in 
degrees. This is Kagan’s position. But could the modal capacities theorist instead adopt a 
binary conception of ‘could have been’, with modal personhood being something that an 
individual either possesses or does not? A thought experiment will help to express my 
reservations. 
Consider a world in which an identity-preserving genetic therapy that somewhat 
increases the intelligence of dogs has achieved widespread adoption. This therapy is called 
superdog therapy, and a dog that has received it is called a superdog. Superdog therapy can 
only be delivered to infant dogs, and due to a mix-up at the vets, a certain dog Rover misses 
out on receiving it. The modal capacities theory implies that Rover is, in our imaginary world, 
a strong modal superdog (HCA, p. 143). 
The point that I want to make here is that (a) the world as described in this thought 
experiment and (b) the world as it actually is sit at opposite ends of a continuum, along which 
possible worlds vary in terms of the degree of adoption of the superdog therapy. The modal 
capacities theorist who adopts a binary conception of modal superdoghood will have to say that 
at some watershed level of adoption, a marginal increase in uptake of the therapy will transform 
all those dogs who have not received the therapy from having low moral status to having near-
superdog moral status. This view strikes me as implausible. 
Before I move on, I want to draw attention to a further lacuna in the luck-based defence 
of Kagan’s appeal to modal capacities. In his discussion of modal capacities, Kagan suggests 
that “modal status … appears to affect one’s [moral] status in an asymmetrical way … what 
matters are the (relevant) possibilities that concern higher or more advanced sets of capacities, 
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not the various possibilities that concern lower or less developed ones” (HCA, p. 140). In other 
words, if a genetic fluke causes some dog Romulus to be born with the cognitive capacities of 
a typical human being, then the fact that Romulus simply ‘got lucky’ ought not to cause any 
substantial reduction in his moral status. That is, I agree, the intuitively plausible view: it would 
be a great injustice to afford Romulus natural rights any weaker than those we afford to human 
beings with the same cognitive capacities, and/or to regard Romulus’ welfare as less important, 
morally speaking, than that of a human being with the same cognitive capacities.  
But if we take the view that bad luck should not be capable of drastically reducing an 
individual’s moral status, then shouldn’t we also take the view that good luck should not be 
capable of drastically increasing an individual’s moral status, as Kagan says happens in the 
Romulus case? As it stands, the luck-based defence of Kagan’s appeal to modal capacities is 
thus at best incomplete. The luck-based defence does not yet tell us why we should accept the 
view that good luck can drastically change a person’s moral status, whereas bad luck cannot.37 
VI. Debunking the modal account of misfortune 
In the last section, I argued that a modal conception of misfortune has counterintuitive 
implications in cases like that of the two poor children. Still, the motivating idea that it is worse 
for a person to narrowly miss out on something than never to have stood a chance of achieving 
it definitely has some initial intuitive appeal. I want to argue here, however, that our intuitions 
do not in fact support the view that narrowly missing out on something is intrinsically worse 
for a person than never standing a chance of achieving it. Rather, we intuit that narrowly 
missing out on something is often a dire state of affairs for a person in virtue of how it typically 
makes people feel. 
When we narrowly miss out on something that we easily could have had – if, for 
example, we happen to be out buying coffee at the moment when Bill Gates pays a surprise 
visit to our company’s office and starts handing out $100 bills38 – we are likely to react with 
feelings of regret and annoyance. These sorts of feelings are unpleasant to experience, and they 
are also instrumentally disvaluable, insofar as they distract or demoralise us from pursuing our 
life plans. We would not, however, have experienced these feelings had Bill Gates simply never 
paid or intended to pay a surprise visit to the company office. Thus, narrowly missing out on 
something often makes us feel worse than never standing a chance of receiving it.39 
But now suppose that a person narrowly misses out on Bill Gates’ $100 bills without 
experiencing any of these negative emotions – suppose that she has an extremely stoical 
disposition, for example. Is narrowly missing out on Bill Gates’ $100 bills any worse for this 
person than a state of affairs in which Bill Gates never visits her office, and thus in which she 
never stands a chance of receiving the $100 bills? I am inclined to suppose that it is not. 
Hence, to the extent that we do sometimes intuit that narrowly missing out on something 
is intrinsically worse for a person than never standing a chance of achieving it, I am inclined 
to believe that our intuitive faculty is being corrupted by our intuitions about how narrowly 
missing out on something typically makes us feel. If only we were to think about the case more 
carefully, we would come to the conclusion that narrowly missing out on something is no more 
intrinsically unfortunate than never standing a chance of achieving it.40 
VII. The advantages of unitarianism 
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According to the anti-unitarian’s dilemma, hierarchical theories of moral status are stuck 
between a rock and a hard place. Complicated theories like Kagan’s modal capacities theory 
manage to avoid counterexamples involving severely impaired human beings. But their 
complexity comes at a cost: it makes it difficult to see why the theorist’s proposed determinants 
of moral status should have the degree of moral importance that is being ascribed to them. By 
contrast, it is easier for a rights-focused, actual-capacities theorist to explain why an 
individual’s actual capacities should have an effect upon her moral status (see §III of this 
paper). But: the actual capacities theory is highly vulnerable to counterexamples involving 
severely impaired human beings. It remains to be seen whether any anti-unitarian theory of 
moral status can escape both horns of the anti-unitarian’s dilemma.41 
 One reliable way to avoid both horns of the anti-unitarian’s dilemma is to embrace 
unitarianism. Unitarian moral standing can be conditioned upon a binary property like 
sentience (the ability to experience pleasure and/or pain), and/or (bare) agency (the ability to 
have, and to wish to act upon, things like desires, wishes, and preferences) (see HCA, chapter 
1). Prima facie, it is much more intuitively plausible to claim that properties like sentience 
and/or agency are the kinds of things that are intrinsically morally important and germane to 
an individual’s moral status than it is to claim that modal capacities, say, are the kinds of things 
that are intrinsically morally important and germane to an individual’s moral status.  
 Although sentience/agency-unitarianism avoids both horns of the anti-unitarian’s 
dilemma, it does not imply that all human beings have moral standing. Since anencephalic 
infants (infants who are born without a cerebrum) lack the capacity for consciousness, 
sentience/agency-unitarianism implies that they lack any moral standing whatsoever. Some 
people might intuit, to the contrary, that all human beings have moral standing, including 
anencephalic infants. However, I think that this intuition is considerably less (a) widespread, 
and (b) robust than the intuition that severely impaired human beings with similar cognitive 
capacities to the lower animals have a moral status equal or comparable to that of typical human 
beings.  
An anonymous reviewer asks whether a unitarian (like myself) who claims that human 
beings typically have lives far richer in well-being than those of the lower animals is thereby 
forced to accept a view almost as implausible as the first horn of the anti-unitarian’s dilemma, 
viz. the view that one should usually prioritise preventing typical human beings from suffering 
physical harms (like toothaches, or getting killed) over preventing cognitively impaired human 
beings from suffering these physical harms, since typical human beings will usually have lives 
richer in well-being than the lives of impaired human beings.  
 In reply, let me say first of all that I do not think that the following claim: ‘(a) one 
should typically give unimpaired human beings priority over impaired human beings in virtue 
of the fact that they will typically have stronger interests at stake’ is anywhere near as 
implausible as this claim: ‘(b) the interests of an unimpaired human being matter more than the 
interests of an impaired human being, even when the impaired human being’s interests are just 
as strong,’ (claim (b) follows from axiological hierarchy plus the first horn of the anti-
unitarian’s dilemma). On the contrary, I think that many people who are attracted to 
consequentialism will regard claim (a) as intuitively plausible. 
 A non-consequentialist unitarian, on the other hand, can avoid claim (a) if she wants to, 
even if she believes that unimpaired human beings will typically have lives richer in well-being 
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than those of impaired human beings. She can claim, for instance, that we should prioritise 
averting R’s toothache over averting S’s toothache only if the difference in welfare at stake is 
u utils or greater. Selecting a suitable value of u will imply that we should prioritise averting 
an unimpaired human being’s toothache over averting a cockroach’s toothache, but not over 
averting an impaired human being’s toothache. Of course, if the welfare loss caused by an 
impaired human being’s toothache is equal to the welfare loss caused by a dog’s toothache, 
then the non-consequentialist unitarian will have to say that we should not prioritise averting 
an impaired or unimpaired human being’s toothache over averting a dog’s toothache. But I 
think that most non-consequentialist unitarians will claim that this implication is not nearly as 
implausible as the first horn of the anti-unitarian’s dilemma. 
VIII. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have drawn attention to one respect (success in avoiding the anti-unitarian’s 
dilemma) in which unitarianism appears to be superior to anti-unitarianism. Of course, I cannot 
hope to have come close here to settling the debate between hierarchy and unitarianism, since 
I lack the space to discuss several of the arguments relevant to that debate. Kagan himself, for 
example, has advanced an important ‘argument from distribution’ in favour of hierarchy (HCA, 
chapter 3), that I lack the space to discuss in this paper.42 Nonetheless, I hope that the arguments 
that I have advanced in this paper can form part of a broader defence of unitarianism, in the 
face of sophisticated new hierarchy theories like Kagan’s. 
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